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ABSTRACT
Territorial reform is the most radical and contested reorganisation of local
government. A sound evaluation of the outcome of such reforms is hence an
important step to ensure the legitimation of any decision on the subject.
However, in our view the discourse on the subject appears to be one sided,
focusing primarily on overall ﬁscal eﬀects scrutinised by economists. The
contribution of this paper is hence threefold: Firstly, we provide an overview
oﬀ territorial reforms in Europe, with a special focus on Eastern Germany as a
promising case for cross-country comparisons. Secondly, we provide an over-
view of the analytical classiﬁcations of these reforms and context factors to be
considered in their evaluation. And thirdly, we analyse the literature on
qualitative performance eﬀects of these reforms. The results show that terri-
torial reforms have a signiﬁcant positive impact on functional performance,
while the eﬀects on participation and integration are indeed ambivalent. In
doing so, we provide substantial arguments for a broader, more inclusive
discussion on the success of territorial reforms.
KEYWORDS Municipal amalgamation eﬀects; territorial reform; municipal mergers; local government
performance; administrative reforms
1. Introduction
Territorial reforms are the most radical and contested reorganisation of the
subnational administration. The academic interest for this phenomenon is
substantial. However, a cleavage divides the literature dealing with the
issue: In a ﬁrst strand, economists provide primarily quantitative ex-post
analysis of such reform ventures.1 As a matter of research design and
method applied, this work more than often focuses on selected ﬁnancial
aspects as reform outputs. Mostly, a narrow focus on economies of scale is
chosen, deﬁned as budget cuts or tax reductions. From an economist’s
perspective, spending per capita (in total or in certain policy ﬁelds) seems
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probably the most salient variable to look at. For most citizens and the
administrative ‘boots on the ground’ this perspective is secondary.
Questions of availability and quality of services can easily mobilise consider-
able shares of a population – the outlook for a smallish tax reduction will
not. While the overall ﬁndings in this cost-centred debate are still incon-
clusive (Holzer 2009), a predominantly critical connotation characterises
many of these economies of scale-centred publications (c.f. Allers and
Geertsema 2016, 660). These often meticulously conducted quantitative
ex-post analyses became highly visible in recent years, as their approach
ﬁts the call for generalizability better than in depth case studies do. We
highly appreciate these studies, as they are instructive and inspiring to the
community. However, we consider the state of the debate as unbalanced at
least. We suspect that much of this research as based on a misconception on
the motives and potentials of the reforms analysed.
Consequently, this paper sets out to promote a second strand of litera-
ture: Public administration scholars and other more empirically oriented
disciplines (geographers, political scientists, demographers etc.) are often
directly engaged in consulting, developing and evaluating politically driven
amalgamation projects.2 In their work, they use a broad spectre of theories
and methods. We would like to bring forward these more comprehensive
and holistic approaches concentrating on the impact dimensions of eﬀec-
tiveness, quality of services and participation. To do so, we ﬁrst provide an
overview oﬀ territorial reforms in Europe, with a special focus on Eastern
Germany as a promising case for cross-country comparison. Secondly, we
outline analytical classiﬁcations for these reforms and propose context
factors to be considered in their evaluation. By analysing the literature on
qualitative performance eﬀects of these reforms, we thirdly provide sub-
stantial arguments for a broader, more inclusive discussion of territorial
reforms’ success. We close with a discussion of the very diﬀerent reform
appraisals and their merits.
2. Territorial reforms in Europe and Germany
2.1 European context
Since the 1970s, territorial reforms have been dealing mainly with ‘up-scaling’,
namely the establishment of bigger units. As a result, in the past decades
(1973–2013) the number of municipalities across several European countries
declined. The most signiﬁcant decrease can be observed in Greece (−94%)
and in Belgium (−75%) (Steiner, Kaiser, and Eythórsson 2016; 28ﬀ.; see also
Table 1). In other countries, such as Iceland, Denmark and the Netherlands,
the number of municipalities declined by more than half.
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Two remarkable examples shall be singled out from the countries
observed. During the most recent territorial reform of 2007 in Denmark,
the number of municipalities (kommuner) declined from 271 to 98 and the
14 counties (amter) were fused into ﬁve regions. The newly established
municipalities count on average around 55,400 inhabitants. Among the
southern European countries, the case of Greece is similarly striking.
During the two reform waves of the 1990s and 2000s (Capodistria reform
in 1998 and Kallikratis reform in 2010), the number of municipalities was
reduced from originally 5800 to 325, increasing the population to up to
33,600 inhabitants on average (Hlepas 2010, 233ﬀ.; 2016). In so doing,
Greece came closer to the so-called North European reform type (cf.
Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, 156; Kuhlmann and Bouckaert 2016, 18).
Similar developments can be observed in Bulgaria (Vodenicharov 2012, 70ﬀ.)
and Lithuania (cf. Saparniene and Lazauskiene 2012, 389ﬀ.). Along with
England and Denmark, these two countries feature the most populous
municipalities in Europe. Only in few countries, the number of municipalities
increased in the last decade (i.e. Slovenia, Poland, Spain). After all,
Table 1. Diﬀerence in the number of municipalities in
Europe between 1973 and 2013 in %.
Northern Europe Southern Europe
Norway −3.4 Slovenia + 44.2
Finland −33.7 Portugal + 1.3
Sweden −37.5 Spain + 0.8
Denmark −64.4 Italy + 0.4
Iceland −67.0 Greece −94.6
Western Europe Eastern Europe
Switzerland −22.6 Poland + 4.8
Germany −25.4
Netherlands −55.3
Belgium −75.0
Overall average −29.3
Source: Steiner, Kaiser, and Eythórsson 2016, 29.
Table 2. Outcome of territorial reforms in East German states.
Outcome of
municipal-level territorial reform
Outcome of
county-level territorial reform
Land
Number of
municipalities
1990
Number of
municipalities
2015
Decrease
(in %)
Number of
counties
1990
Number of
counties
2016
Decrease
(in %)
Saxony-
Anhalt
1349 218 84 31 6 80
Brandenburg 1775 418 76 48 14 70
Saxony 1623 430 74 37 11 70
Thuringia 1707 849 50 38 14 63
Mecklenb.-
West Pom.
1117 783 30 35 17 51
Source: Bogumil 2016, 24, updated.
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municipalities in European countries still show signiﬁcant diﬀerences in size
and population. For example, the average size spans from 1640 to
139,000 km2, while the amount of municipalities with less than 5000 inha-
bitants ranges between the 96 and 2 per cent (and even 0 per cent).
In many countries, over the past 40 years a trend to consolidate local
governments in Europe has become evident (cf. also Kuhlmann and
Wollmann 2014, 150ﬀ.). The phenomenon concerns not only countries of
the northern European group (Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
some German Länder) typically operating with up-scaling strategies, but also
southern and eastern European countries (i.e. Greece, Bulgaria, Lithuania).
Rather than precluding intermunicipal cooperation (‘transscaling’;
Baldersheim and Rose 2010; Hulst and van Montfort 2007; Franzke,
Klimovský, and Pinterič 2016), this trend often parallels it. However, a second
group of countries still classify into the southern European reform type
(France, Italy, several CEE countries). These countries maintained the histor-
ical, fragmented communal structure as reform initiatives are voluntary. In
support of the small communities a layer of intercommunal associations was
set up. Despite showing a common, converging ‘southern European’ pattern
of territorial change, these countries also ﬁgure signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
average municipal size (i.e. with 1720 inhabitants in France and 7250 in
Italy).
2.2 East German Länder as (unvoluntary) experimental ﬁeld for
territorial reform
The reformative activity in Germany’s Länder is twofold (Bogumil and Ebinger
2011). In the West, since the big reforms of the 1970s, territorial reforms at
municipal level have been sporadic and almost only voluntary. In the so-
called ‘new’ federal states in the East, a cascade of territorial reforms suc-
ceeded since the early 1990s (see Table 2). This extraordinary 20 years-long
reform history provides a formidable laboratory to study all aspects of terri-
torial reforms in a comparative perspective. The need to ‘amalgamate in these
Länder derives from the fact that after the reuniﬁcation the newly established
municipalities were organised into small-scale units. This led to two related
issues. Firstly, these small units could not live up to the demands of the
growing portfolio of tasks emerging at the local level – let alone those tasks
to be transferred from state administration (c.f. Ebinger, Grohs, and Reiter
2011). Secondly, the eastern German Länder were confronted with a socio-
economic disaster following the reuniﬁcation: the collapse of the industrial
core along with the evaporation of the economic and ﬁscal strength of entire
regions, massive emigration und demographic imbalance. Set against this
background, the pressure to (re)build a functional, eﬃcient communal self-
government was particularly high, leading to a ﬁrst wave of consolidation in
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mid-1990s. However, the overall socio-economic situation and the debt cap
induced by the EU aggravated the budget constraints. A second wave of
territorial reforms was induced between 2007 and 2011 in Saxony, Saxony-
Anhalt and in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. This strong reform momentum
has come to a halt with the current reform attempts in the Länder
Brandenburg and Thuringia. The foreseeable failure of these last two reforms
initiatives in 2017 indicates changing winds concerning the reform climate.
The authors attribute this to the juxtaposition of political and public discourse
to the possible eﬀects of costs saving (‘economies’). While the early reforms
were often carried out by reform coalitions striving for administrative sustain-
ability and competitiveness of their region, the new deliberations alone have
become the plaything of political confrontation.
The situation of the Land Brandenburg is exemplary: The population will
shrink by about 10% until 2030 and the average age will rise further, while
the population density will develop more and more asymmetrically as a
function of the distance to Berlin (Landesamt für Bauen und Verkehr 2012).
Consequently, maintaining infrastructure and services will become a chal-
lenge in most part of the country. The cross-party study commission set up
in preparation for the reform of the administrative structure came to the
conclusion that a territorial reform at county level is indispensable. (SPD/DIE
LINKE Brandenburg 2013; cf. Bogumil and Ebinger 2012).
While the appraisals were similar across eastern Germany, the set oﬀ
reform ventures (cf. Bogumil 2016, 23ﬀ.) vary considerably concerning dri-
vers (big or small coalition), scope (only county level or municipal – though
with time oﬀset), target ﬁgures set, actual territorial changes achieved as well
as the related devolution process.
In Saxony-Anhalt, a territorial reform was executed both on county and
municipal level. Following the ﬁrst county-level territorial reform of 1994, the
Land Parliament introduced further changes in 2007 under the auspices of
CDU and SPD. The number of counties was reduced from 21 to 11 with
153,000 inhabitants on average (ranging from 86,000 to 223,000 in 2015) and
a surface extending between 1400 km2 and 2400 km2. The three county-free
cities were maintained. On the municipal level, two reforms succeeded in
2004 and 2011. By amalgamation, the number of municipalities decreased by
more than 80 per cent, from 1,300 (2003) to 218 (2015), counting 11,000
inhabitants on average. Organisation-wise, the ‘double-decker’ model of two
full-ﬂedged local levels (local congregations and municipal associations) with
complementing responsibilities was introduced in Saxony-Anhalt (Kuhlmann
and Wollmann 2014, 166ﬀ.; Kuhlmann et al. 2012; 14ﬀ.).
Similarly, Saxony implemented territorial reforms both on municipal and
county level. After the ﬁrst territorial reform on county level in 1994–1996
and on municipal level in 1998, CDU and SPD approved another reform in
2008. The remaining 22 counties were brought down to 10 and the seven
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county-free cities to three. The 10 counties inhabited between 200,000 and
355,000 citizens in 2012. The size of the counties stretches between 1400
and 2400 km2, with the exception of one counting 950 km2. On the
municipal level, the number of units declined by voluntarily amalgamation
from originally 1626 in 1990 to 540 in the ﬁrst territorial reform of 1998,
ﬁnally amounting to 426 as of today, while the average number of inhabi-
tants increased to 9500.
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania introduced the ﬁrst county-level territorial
reform in 1994. A further reformative attempt in 2007 was thwarted by the
countries constitutional court (Bogumil and Ebinger 2008b). However, in
2011 the Parliament ﬁnally approved a reform with the support of CDU
and SPD (Landesregierung Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 2015). The 12 coun-
ties merged to six and the six county-free cities to two. The surface of these
new counties covers between 2100 and 5400 km2, corresponding to the
biggest county in all of Germany (cf. Hammerschmid et al. 2015). The
population varied between 156,000 and 264,000 in 2012, with an average
of 217,000. Mecklenburg-West Pomerania has not carried out any territorial
reform at municipal level, yet.
The Parliament of Brandenburg agreed in July 2016 on a blue print for
structural reform of the administration in 2019 at hands of the parties SPD
and Die Linke (The Left). The reform envisaged a population of at least 175,000
inhabitants in the counties and 150,000 in county-free cities for 2030 (Landtag
Brandenburg 2016; cf. Bogumil and Ebinger 2012; Bogumil, Kintzinger, and
Mehde 2014; SPD/DIE LINKE Brandenburg 2013). A ﬁrst scientiﬁcally backed
proposal, calling for bringing down the 14 counties to 9 and from four
county-free cities to one (Potsdam) (cf. MIK 2016), met strong opposition.
Against the reservations of the parliament’s study commission, the Ministry of
the Interior of the Land Brandenburg felt urged to devise a watered-down
solution counting 11 counties. However, because of persisting opposition, the
county-level territorial reform has been ﬁnally discarded in November 2017.
In Thuringia, following the ﬁrst territorial reform at county level in 1994,
Die Linke, SPD and greens approved in 2016 a blue print and an interim law
for an administrative, functional and territorial reform (Landesregierung
Thüringen 2016). The territorial reform envisaged the decrease of the muni-
cipalities from 850 to 200, the 17 counties ought to merge to 8, striving to
achieve a minimum population of 130,000 inhabitants at county level and
6000 at municipal level. Of the six county-free cities only Erfurt and Jena
(with more than 100.000 inhabitants) should maintain their status (Bogumil
2016). Still, the reformative plans of the Land government met strong
resistance from the opposition and the communal arena; furthermore, a
negative judgement of the constitutional court declared invalid the ratiﬁca-
tion of the interim law into reform because of formal reasons. As a result, the
government abandoned the project on 30 November 2017.
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3. Analytical approaches to territorial reforms
3.1 Classiﬁcation of reform approaches
The substantial diﬀerences across reform approaches shown in the previous
sections can be synthetized into four categories:
Level in consideration: While some European countries comprise a local
system made up of several tiers with roughly a municipal level and a county
level above it, others only feature a single tier. The territorial reforms in the
former group of countries can concern either the lower or the higher level
as well as both.3 The experience in the East German states shows that in
two-tier systems reforms are generally required on both levels. Nevertheless,
reforms on the county level appear to be more urgent.
Reform approach: The territorial reforms in Europe can be grouped into
two types (see Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, 150ﬀ.). The ﬁrst one is a rather
’soft‘ type, insofar as it concerns mainly administrative cooperation and
resource pooling (so-called trans-scaling, i.e. in France, Italy, Spain, southern
Germany). The second, ’hard‘ version consists in territorial amalgamation and
municipal association (so-called up-scaling, i.e. in Great Britain, Scandinavia,
northern Germany and parts of the East; cf. Baldersheim and Rose 2010, 20),
aimed at enhancing the administrative performance of the municipalities by
economies of scale (cf. John 2010, 106ﬀ. for the United Kingdom).
Scope: The scope of the reforms can be comprehensive or partial
(Baldersheim and Rose 2010, 13ﬀ.). Comprehensive amalgamations refer to
the territorial structure of the municipalities of a Land (or a Federal state) as
a whole, whereas partial territorial reforms concerns speciﬁc subregions or
municipalities. Comprehensive territorial reforms succeeded in Belgium,
Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden as well as occasionally in some German
Länder. In contrast, partial approaches evolved in Norway, Steiermark in
Austria, and in the majority of the Swiss cantons (Steiner, Kaiser, and
Eythórsson 2016, 30ﬀ.).
Implementation strategy: The scope of territorial reforms is usually a
function of the implementation strategy chosen. Baldersheim and Rose
(2010, 13ﬀ.) propose a diﬀerentiation between bottom-up and top-down
strategies. Bottom-up amalgamations are grounded on the principle of
voluntary association of municipalities, which also generally act as pro-
moters. Top-down amalgamations are mostly compulsory or forced asso-
ciations, prompted by higher government levels and enforced by law
(eventually even against the will of the municipalities in question).
Following this dimension as the basis for comparative analysis of territor-
ial reforms in Europe, it appears that top-down strategies are pursued
especially in Denmark, Finland, Greece and Sweden. Belgium and the
Netherlands also belong to this category, while in Germany it only applies
to some Länder (e.g. North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, Brandenburg,
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Saxony) (Steiner, Kaiser, and Eythórsson 2016, 27ﬀ.). Instead, the bottom-
up strategy aﬀects mainly Norway but it can be found in Switzerland and
in Thuringia, too.
German speaking countries often develop hybrid types of these imple-
mentation strategies or some mitigated form of the top-down approach,
rolled out in stages: After exhaustive discussion of target structures with all
stakeholders at a conceptual stage, local authorities are oﬀered ad hoc
reform-incentives (so-called ‘marriage bonus’) during a voluntary stage. In
accepting these oﬀers, local governments can chose partners within a given
target structure and avoid forceful amalgamation in a ﬁnal, compulsory
reform stage. Such layered processes had been deployed already in the
1970s and have been applied recently in Saxony-Anhalt (Saxony-Anhalt
2008), Rheinland-Pfalz and Steiermark, Austria (Steiermark 2013).
3.2 Contextual factors for the success of the reform
Besides territorial shifts, a number of other factors (which can also be
speciﬁc to the Land or region) inﬂuence the reform eﬀects. As a conse-
quence, the impact of ‘upscaling’ on the overall performance is diﬃcult to
distinguish.
As all political processes, administrative reform policy and even more so
territorial policy is not a straight forward rational process but also – and
especially – a power driven exercise (Sabatier 1991; Bogumil and Ebinger
2008a; Ebinger and Bogumil 2016). The following factors appear to be
particularly important to explain impact and results of the reforms, espe-
cially in international comparative perspective:
– Administrative system and culture of the Land or region in question.
Amalgamations in one Land do not automatically lead to the same
eﬀects in another Land;
– Initial status of the territory before the reform, especially size, number
of participant municipalities, type of association (Merger vs.
Amalgamation), and reforms already occurred in the past. Firstly, amal-
gamations can trigger follow-up investments and professionalisation
inputs in the administration, which exceed the eventual gain in econo-
mies. Secondly, up to a certain point of territorial size and number of
partners (which still cannot be clearly deﬁned), the beneﬁts of the
reform may decrease again rather than further increasing (Fritz and
Feld 2015, 11ﬀ.);
– Reform process/implementation strategy: voluntariness of the amalga-
mation. In the case of non-voluntary associations, it is more diﬃcult to
achieve a synergy as a result of the reform and the satisfaction with the
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administration is clearly lower than in voluntary associations (Hansen
2015; Fritz and Feld 2015; 14ﬀ.);
– Local power and consensus-building dynamics: actors constellations, party
competition and vote/oﬃce seeking, inﬂuence of the media and the use/
instrumentalisation of democratic participation tools each can function as a
game changer concerning reform outcomes (cf. Ebinger 2010);
– Political incentives and political steering of the reform process: First,
the willingness to amalgamate often can be bought through political
and ﬁscal concessions. However, this dowry can pose a heavy burden
for administrative performance and budgets. Second, without a precise
guiding principle the choice of an amalgamation partner is driven by
other factors than functional considerations. Such functionally dis-
torted entities may thwart economic and functional gains. Third, com-
mon pool problems can sabotage saving targets. Notably in the period
between announcement and implementation of the amalgamation
incentives for excessive spending may arise (Fritz and Feld 2015).
– Further intervening factors: the existent resources and performance
level of the single local authorities or the preference order of citizens
might inﬂuence performance (i.e. through levelling eﬀects on the
service level or common pool problems for investors) (Park 2013;
Allers and Geertsema 2016, 662ﬀ.).
These contextual conditions needs to be taken into account, especially
when it comes to the transferability of research results. ‘Learning from
others’ is possible, though being a question of sense of proportion and
balance.
4. Analysis of the impacts of territorial reforms on performance
When assessing performance, administrative and organisational strength of
municipalities it is important to keep in mind that it arises from their
organisation and resource capacity as well as from their room for man-
oeuvre in ﬁnance, politics, organisation, personnel etc. On the other hand,
it is their ability to solve local problems and to inﬂuence social develop-
ments in the territory in the long term. This includes the ability to fulﬁl
public tasks improving quality, accessibility, legitimacy and eﬃciency
(administrative strength), as well as to act as a strong carrier of public
institutions (organisational strength). The following literature based analysis
will be centred upon two non-monetary dimensions of the reform impact
(cf. Wagener 1969; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2011, 2013; Kuhlmann and
Wayenberg 2016): (1) performance, administrative and organisational
strength and (2) integration capacity, participation and democratic control.
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4.1 Europe
Beyond ﬁscal eﬀects, the literature on performance eﬀects of territorial
reforms is ﬁnite: Very recently, Steiner, Kaiser, and Eythórsson (2016) con-
ducted an international comparative study across 15 European countries.
They concluded that territorial reforms led to the improvement of task
accomplishment, service quality and standing against higher administrative
levels. This depends on the fact that bigger territorial structures receive more
tasks, functions and, partly, autonomy (Steiner, Kaiser, and Eythórsson 2016,
26). Except for Italy, the experts interviewed pointed at the improvement of
service quality as central result of territorial amalgamations, while the reduc-
tion of costs was perceived only sometimes – particularly in Belgium,
Germany, Greece and Iceland (Steiner, Kaiser, and Eythórsson 2016, 35).
Another outcome achieved in most countries (Greece, Italy, Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland) is the improvement in municipal autonomy, consisting
in higher ﬁnancial leeway, expansion of tasks as well as uplifting of previous
obligations for inter-municipal cooperation (Steiner, Kaiser, and Eythórsson
2016, 36). In multiple studies conducted in Switzerland, it is shown that the
statement ‘municipal size – a success factor’ tends to be true (cf. Lauber
2014, 145). Municipal amalgamations in the canton of Lucern brought about
more responsibility and functions for the municipalities, notably the guar-
antee of organisational autonomy. Moreover, more experts could be
employed and the municipal councils could be further involved in strategic
tasks. Spatial planning and municipal infrastructures also saw some beneﬁts.
Admittedly, not all of these results came fully into eﬀect but they can be
expected in the long term, after the reorganisation of basic structures has
been carried out and consolidated (cf. Lauber 2014, 144ﬀ.). The study by
Steiner and Kaiser (2017) showed positive impacts of municipal amalgama-
tions in 28 service areas. Nevertheless, the comparison between amalga-
mated and non-amalgamated municipalities revealed several functions
where no distinction between study group and control group was noted
(Steiner and Kaiser 2017, 14). Overall, the authors conclude that municipal
amalgamations improve the quality of service provision, in line with the
results of other international studies (OECD 2014; Schimmelpenick et al.
1984). However, the relationship between municipal size and citizens’ satis-
faction with government performance is ambivalent. A study about the
impact of territorial reforms in Denmark showed that amalgamations are
generally associated with lower citizens’ satisfaction with local and munici-
pal performance as well as with the infrastructure facilities. The author infers
a negative relationship between size and satisfaction (Hansen 2015, 385).
However, the background for such observation might be the intervening
factors linked to municipal size. The international comparative study by
Denters et al. (2014) reveals that at least two factors intervene in the
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interplay of size and satisfaction: citizens’ perception of government chal-
lenges and local political conﬁdence. In light of these factors, the authors
established that the eﬀect of size is but indirect. A negative eﬀect could only
been seen in the personal performance, while the satisfaction with local
problem-solving and municipal facilities also did not present any negative
indirect eﬀects linked to size (Denters et al. 2014, 210).
Overall, the international public administration literature widely agrees that
amalgamations strengthen the institutional capacity of municipalities (as
opposed to the inconclusive, but critical economic literature). This becomes
evident in more robust organisational structures, higher professionalisation of
employees, improved capacities for strategic policy-making and problem-
solving and a rise in standards as well as (partially) in customer-orientation
(see above; Bleker and De Koningh 1987; Denters, de Jong, and Thomassen
1990; Toonen et al. 1998; Fraanje et al. 2008; Alta et al. 2002; for a summary,
Schaap and Karsten 2017).
4.2 Germany
For the case of the German Länder, a series of expert opinions and reports
illustrate the relation of territorial upscaling with municipalities’ capacity,
based on diﬀerent evaluation criteria and methods.
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania: Hesse’s study (2015) presents empirical
ﬁndings concerning the impacts of county-level territorial reforms in
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania on administrative performance, organisation
and innovation capacity of the counties. In the study, the consequences of
county restructuring for local self-government were analysed on a three-
year span. The consequences of the reform are professionalisation beneﬁts
and expansion of services, resulting in increased territorial and political
strength (Hesse 2015, 147). In a similar positive vein, the 2015 report of
the Court of Audit concluded that the consolidation of organisation and
staﬀ in the third year after the restructuring is well advanced
(Landesregierung Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2015, 25). Moreover, positive
ﬁnancial eﬀects were reaped from staﬀ reductions (of just about 3 per cent,
or 156 full-time equivalent since 2012). Besides the further saving potential,
the ﬁscal performance of the counties in general clearly improved since
2012. Further synergies and cost reductions were brought about by the
fusion of municipal companies (i.e. in the ﬁelds of transport and waste)
(Landesregierung Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2015, 39). These ﬁndings were
conﬁrmed in a more recent study concerning the eﬀects of territorial
reforms in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (cf. Hammerschmid et al. 2015,
2016). Further synergies developed in IT structures, ﬁnancial departments,
and human resources. As a result of the territorial reforms, cooperation
between municipal facilities or companies now can be smoothly promoted
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leading to new synergies (Hammerschmid et al. 2016, 28). Furthermore,
some individual interviewees reported a certain improvement of the service
for private companies, insofar as the number of relevant contact partners
was reduced and economic development promoted (Hammerschmid et al.
2016, 28).
Saxony: To evaluate the eﬀects of the territorial reform in Saxony it is
particularly important to take into account their direct relation with a
functional reform. In line with the devolution of tasks, a total of 3.416
state employees were deployed to the consolidated counties in 2008. In
2009, additional 759 employees from former county-free cities and further
550 employees of subsidiary facilities (road maintenance depots, vocational
schools, registry oﬃce, etc.) were transferred to county administrations. Due
to this shift in functions and personnel on county level, direct reform eﬀects
on eﬃciency could not be singled out (Sächsischer Rechnungshof 2009,
332). However, to the Court, positive reform eﬀects were indicated by the
still on-going processes of organisational consolidation on county level
(merging of high schools, vocational schools, boarding schools, media cen-
tres, evening schools etc.).
5. Analysis of the eﬀects on participation and integration
A classic research topic in political and administrative science is the possible
interplay of territorial size and social cohesion, integrative capacity and
democratic participation. Already in 1887, Ferdinand Tönnies analysed the
social and political impact of urbanisation and territorial enlargement in his
ground-breaking book ‘Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft’. The sociologist Louis
Wirth (1938, 11ﬀ.) considers territorial enlargement to be the origin of
declining community identity and increasing social distrust. Several authors
took up this so-called ‘decline of community model’. Their common basic
assumption is that increasing territorial size has a negative eﬀect on social
cohesion, particularly by eroding political and social participation) (Dahl and
Tufte 1973, 41–65; Verba and Nie 1972, 229–247; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978,
269–285.; Oliver 2000, 2001; Putnam 2000, 204–215).
Opponents against this pessimist vision, mockingly labelled ‘Lovely Lilliput’
theory (Denters et al. 2014, 17ﬀ.), argue that the shift in territorial size actually
brings along new forms of social aggregation. These are supposed to be
characterised by higher diversity and variety in social composition, as well as
in social and political institutions of the constituencies (Fischer 1995). Better
representation and articulation of the diverse (and at times contrasting)
values, perspectives, interests and aims of diﬀerent population sections is
expected (Dahl and Tufte 1973, 30–40, 89–109; Baglioni et al. 2007).
According to Verba and Nie (1972), this diﬀerentiated and diversiﬁed
community leads to the creation of a more competitive democratic system,
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labelled ‘mobilisation model’. According to this model, citizens have increas-
ing interest in political participation and knowledge of the political pro-
cesses (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978, 270). Furthermore, a greater
responsiveness towards citizens’ political preferences is implied (Denters
and Geurts 1998; Mouritzen 1989; 663). Taking into account that bigger
municipalities decide and administrate more (important) decisions, it is
argued that the interest in political participation increases too.
5.1 Europe
Overall, recent comparative research (see Denters et al. 2014) concluded
that territorial size has at most a moderate eﬀect on local democracy. Other
explanatory factors are more important, i.e. individual socio-economic
characteristics (gender, education etc.). Despite some indirect and few
direct eﬀects of territorial size on aspects of participation (see below),
the impact of territorial changes on the exercise of democratic participa-
tion rights should not be overestimated (Houlberg 2010, 325). Democratic
costs should hence be small or marginal – partly they simply seem not to
exist at all. As a matter of fact, even the positive impacts of territorial
enlargement on citizens’ democratic participation, political interest and
competence can be hardly (or not at all) demonstrated empirically
(Denters et al. 2014, 315).
A recent meta-study of 15 countries (cf. Van Houwelingen 2017, 417) on
the inﬂuence of municipal size on political participation concluded that a
relation can be established only rarely. A comparative study of municipali-
ties in Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Switzerland found no sys-
tematic relationship between territorial size and electoral turnout in three of
the four countries. Only for the Netherlands such an eﬀect was discovered.
Other (control) variables – hardly related to territorial size – explain turnout
rates, namely the social embeddedness of citizens (i.e. membership in
associations, clubs; cf. Denters et al. 2014, 229ﬀ.., 304). . These recent
ﬁndings are in line with an earlier study reporting no signiﬁcant eﬀect of
amalgamations beyond the general decline in voter participation
(Kraaykamp, Van Dam, and Toonen 2001). However, they contrast with
previous studies, showing the negative impact of municipal amalgamation
on electoral turnout (Denters, de Jong, and Thomassen 1990; Denters and
Geurts 1998; Toonen et al. 1998; Frandsen 2002; Fraanje et al. 2008; for a
summary, cf. Schaap and Karsten 2017).
Denters et al. (2014) also discovered that territorial size aﬀected social
activities only in one (Norway) of the four case (Denters et al. 2014, 304). In
the Swiss case, increasing territorial size of municipalities had no negative
impact on the willingness to participate in referenda. On the contrary, a
positive eﬀect was registered in the case of municipalities with assembly
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systems (Denters et al. 2014, 305). Another ﬁnding of the study is the
marginal relationship between territorial size and the political interest of
citizens. A negative eﬀect could only be found in the Netherlands, while in
the remaining three countries a greater territorial size did not diminish the
general political interest of the citizens. A study concerning territorial
reforms in Denmark (Mouritzen 2010) concluded that the collective demo-
cratic participation in the form of social and political organisations and
associations tends to increase with territorial size. This is attributed to the
fact that democratic participation in political organisations is more common
and ‘normal’ in bigger municipalities than in smaller ones (Mouritzen
2010, 35).
Nevertheless, bigger municipalities do have some negative eﬀects on
speciﬁc aspects of political participation. The four countries study highlights
that the level of party political activity of the citizens is higher in the case of
smaller municipalities, than in bigger ones (with exception of Switzerland).
These ﬁndings are also consistent with previous studies conducted in the
Netherland reporting a negative relation between territorial size and the
willingness of citizens to engage in local parties (Fraanje et al. 2008; Toonen
et al. 1998; Schaap and Karstens 2017). The growing ‘representation ratio’
(inhabitants pro mandate) and the resulting burden to speak for a higher
number of voters might explain this eﬀect (Denters and Geurts 1998;
Bogumil 2016; 41). In Switzerland, the only country in Europe where muni-
cipal assemblies are still institutionalised,4 municipal territorial size has a
negative eﬀect on the willingness to participate (Denters et al. 2014, 303). In
the four countries study (Denters et al. 2014), the comparatively strongest
negative relationship is found between territorial size and the inclination of
citizens to get in touch with local authorities. This result, however, clearly
contradicts older studies, which reported a greater willingness among citi-
zens of amalgamated municipalities to get in touch with local authorities
(i.e. per post) and to participate to municipal consultations (Fraanje et al.
2008, 81ﬀ.). It was argued, that bigger municipalities provide greater oppor-
tunities to participate beyond the ballot box (Denters, de Jong, and
Thomassen 1990). Even for the Swiss case, neither a declining willingness
of citizens to get in touch with local authorities nor any decline in citizens’
identiﬁcation with the community was discovered (Steiner, Kaiser, and
Eythórsson 2016, 13ﬀ.). Summing up, a mixed picture evolves: municipal
amalgamations at times may strengthen or weaken the relation to local
authorities (Mouritzen 1989; Denters and Geurts 1998; Schaap and Karsten
2017). Staying within a size thresholds seems to be important to ensure
participation: Among Danish municipalities counting from 20,000 to 30,000
and from 70,000 to 80,000 inhabitants a higher size was related with a slight
decrease in individual turn-out and political trust. However, based on these
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results, no tipping-point can be established with certainty. (Mouritzen
2010, 35).
Considering the various results, it is obvious that generalising claims
concerning (negative) eﬀects of territorial reforms on local democracy are
to be rejected (Mouritzen 2010, 36). Eﬀects are more complex, deter-
mined by systemic and local circumstances and often inextricably
contradictory.
5.2 Germany
In the current discourse, prevalent studies show alleged political costs of the
territorial reforms. Declining turnout and the strengthening of populist
parties (i.e. the AfD in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania) are related to territorial
enlargement (cf. Rösel and Sonnenburg 2016, 12). Reform-related shifts in
political majorities and the reduction in voting power of larger constituen-
cies are made responsible for this eﬀect).5 However, these ﬁndings contra-
dict several other studies looking into political eﬀects of territorial reforms:
Eventual negative eﬀects on participation to local election are considered to
be minimal (Seitz 2007, 35ﬀ.). Moreover, in analysing seven Länder, Seitz
(2007, 35ﬀ.) found no relationship between size and the willingness to run
for a mandate in county council. In addition, upscaling rises the importance
of mandates (Bogumil 2016, 41ﬀ.), also due to the shift in the relevance of
the decisions to be taken in the amalgamated territories. Admittedly, this
boost comes at a prize (Ems 2016; Ems and Nürnberger 2018; Hesse 2015):
The political representatives notice the additional burdens, but do not feel
deterred by them. Legitimacy of local action is not impaired; there are still
enough applicants from diﬀerent groups for the county-level elections (Ems
2016, 96, 101). Hesse explains this with adaptation processes subsequent to
the reforms. A fundamental endangerment of the honorary oﬃce is hence
not be recognised (Hesse 2015, 136).
Local identity and possible identity loss are a recurring issue with territor-
ial reforms. Bigger, amalgamated units could alienate local politics and
citizens, leading to political disenchantment and to further distance
among citizens, politics and the administration. For the German case, in
line with the overall picture, no clear cut assertions can be made: A study on
Brandenburg (Büchner and Franzke 2001) revealed both positive and nega-
tive eﬀects of amalgamations.
Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we presented approaches and evidence on the eﬀects of
territorial reforms in Germany and in Europe drawn from public administra-
tion research. The aim of this paper was to provide a more holistic
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perspective of administrative science within the discourse on the impact of
territorial reforms. To do so, territorial reforms in Europe and especially in
Eastern Germany were mapped, an overview on the analytical approaches
to territorial reforms was provided and ﬁnally a summary of evaluations of
these reforms proposed.
These empirical analyses, despite all the diﬀerences, show a positive
eﬀect of upscaling reforms on most performance indicators. The question
is how the notable diﬀerence in the assessment of the reforms between
economists and public administration comes about. The two communities
do not speak to each other, as each – for obvious reasons – tends to stick to
their own logics, data and approaches. We presume that the one decisive
diﬀerence is the presumed aim of the reform ventures. On an abstract level,
Blom-Hansen et al. (2016, 1) put the reason for reform in a nutshell:
“Reformers have had several objectives, including reinforcing democracy and
building local government capacity [ . . . ]. But the main motivation has been
economic – to reduce costs by capturing economies of scale.”
Most of the scholars engaged in the subject might agree on this appraisal.
However, the consequences drawn from this observation diﬀer dramatically.
Many economists conclude that success or failure must hence be measur-
able in budget terms – as a reduction of spending on particular tasks,
contraction of overall budget or a reduction of tax burdens. Following this
path, several authors found no such eﬀect. This is not at all surprising,
considering political processes and exigencies on the local level. ‘Saving
money’ (read as externalised economies) is only a secondary goal. Savings
derived from amalgamations – if existent at all – will most probably be
internalised within the system for several reasons:
First, gains in eﬃciency will be used to safeguard the sustainability of the
local government system. Maintaining or improving local governments’
service quality and problem solving capacity in times of mushrooming
regulation, rising citizens’ demands, demographic change and other com-
plex social challenges with at best stagnant ﬁscal resources requires perma-
nent eﬃciency gains. Any tiny room for manoeuvre will be used to deliver
new, improved or more products and services, as the optimal service level
rises (Buettner and Holm-Hadulla 2013) and not be used to reduce the
overall budget (c.f. Allers and Geertsema 2016, 678).
Moreover, ﬁxed costs are diﬃcult to reduce by municipal amalgamation
(c.f. Drew, Kortt, and Dollery 2016; Blom-Hansen et al. 2016, 17). Cost per
unit are almost static in many areas. In the most costly ones as social
services, size is almost unrelated to cost, as overhead structures to be
streamlined account for a marginal share of the expenditures only. In infra-
structure-bound ﬁelds such as schools, streets or other public facilities,
synergies can be retrieved only after considerable upfront investments in
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machinery or new buildings. Finally, the reduction of staﬀ is in most public
service regimes limited to ‘natural’ turnover. Hence even when synergies
would lead to staﬀ reductions (instead of quality or service improvement),
this would only be noticeable on the long run. Despite these limitations,
most economic analyses ﬁnd indeed a cost-reducing eﬀect of amalgama-
tions on spending on administration (Allers and Geertsema 2016, 661 with
further reference).
Finally, quality of service delivery is almost completely out of the focus of
budget-centred analyses. However, increased size will (often for the ﬁrst time)
allow for division of labour, professionalisation and specialisation – a capacity
almost indispensable in the face of spiralling complexity and professional
demands (c.f. Ebinger 2013, 118f.). Hence, the same budget will produce an
improved quality of output – invisible to the eyes of the economists, operating
with crude service-level indicators, at best (Allers and Geertsema 2016; 662;
Blom-Hansen et al. 2016; 7, 17). We are aware that changes brought about by
territorial reforms are hard to capture even by case studies. These impacts are
hard to quantify, they appear just in the medium term and contingent to the
implementation eﬀorts, and they even can revert, when the municipality
reaches a certain size. However, we are convinced that a more open debate
between the strands of literature dealing with the subject of territorial reforms
will help to overcome these challenges.
The impact on participation and integration capacity of the municipalities
is often a matter of conﬂicting goals that cannot be readily solved. Negative
eﬀects can be found in relation to the workload for the honorary oﬃce and
to the question of local identity (with some limitations on the county level).
Nevertheless, these are often ambivalent eﬀects, as in the case of citizen-
orientation (professional administrative work for the citizens vs. spatial
remoteness) and in the quality (cost vs. value). Upscaling – within a certain
magnitude – seems to have no impact on the capacity or willingness to take
up an honorary post, neither in municipalities nor counties. However, ela-
borating reform processes can certainly mitigate or prevent certain negative
eﬀects. Overall, there is no valid evidence that the legitimacy and citizen
orientation of local action deteriorate appreciably if certain territorial limits
are not exceeded. In sum, through territorial and functional reforms, the
county level gains in substance and organisational capacity. Despite these
ﬁndings, the current developments in the German reform debates suggests
that rational discussions of reform eﬀects become increasingly more diﬃ-
cult. This article hopefully contributes to turn this trend.
Notes
1. For state of the art and further reference, see Alders/Geertsema 2016 and
Blom-Hansen et al. 2016.
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2. Even the authors of this paper (in diﬀerent constellations) have been often
called upon by the Land governments to provide their expert opinion on
reform ventures (Bogumil and Ebinger 2012; Bogumil, Kintzinger, and Mehde
2014; Bogumil 2016; Kuhlmann, Seyfried, and Siegel 2017). Kuhlmann, Seyfried,
and Siegel (2017) conducted a (meta) analysis of 83 scientiﬁc studies and other
research (i.e. Court of Audit) allowed to expand the content of the discussion
around the reform impacts, while taking into account also diﬀerent methods,
approaches, time frames, and interest groups.
3. Refer to the OECD Country Proﬁles for an overview of the countries where the
municipal system is organised into one or two level: http://www.oecd.org/
regional/regional-policy/country-proﬁles.htm.
4. In the municipal assemblies, known also in Brandenburg and Schleswig-
Holstein until the 20th century, all citizens of the municipality eligible to
vote can take legally binding decisions upon issues concerning the munici-
pality. These assembly systems do not foresee a municipal council.
5. For a detailed critique of the methods and design, see Kuhlmann, Seyfried, and
Siegel 2017, 46ﬀ.
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